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Comment

Judicial Jabberwocky in the Presidential
Election 2000: When Law and Facts Collide

with Politics

I.

INTRODUCTION

Long before the United States Constitution was ratified, Americans
displayed a deep skepticism of the judiciary.1 Codification of extremely
detailed and complex laws was the palliate to judicial activism. 2 People
believed that if the laws were all published and readily accessible, judges
would have less ability to substitute their own personal values and
predilections for the will of the people, established through the
legislation promulgated by their chosen representatives. Hamilton's first
essay on the judiciary assured New Yorkers that "the judiciary is beyond
comparison the weakest of the three departments of power" and that
1. See generally GORDON WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787,
298-303 (1969) (noting the colonists' distrust of judges, who were members of the elite
class, and insistence upon a written constitution and written laws).
2. "'What people in their senses would make the judges, who are fallible men,
depositaries [sic] of the law; when the easy, reasonable method of printing, at once secures
its perpetuity, and divulges it to those who ought in justice to be made acquainted with
it.'" Id. at 302-03 (quoting ROBERT Ross, RUDIMENTS OF LAW AND GOVERNMENT, DEDUCED

FROM THE LAW OF NATURE 35-37 (Charleston 1783)).
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"the liberty of the people can never be endangered ... so long as the
judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislative and executive."3 But history has revealed that the judiciary wields great power
in its ability to engineer social change under the guise of "interpreting"
the Constitution or statutes.4 Judicial activism is not only quite often
expected, it is also praised-by those who support the result.5
A significant distinction must be made, however, between a good
decision and a desirable result. A good decision is a principled one: a
decision reached by using accepted tools of construction and recognizing
both the appropriate role of the judiciary as the nonpolitical branch and
the limited role of the judiciary in deciding social policy, regardless of
whether the decision-maker necessarily agrees with the outcome. This
distinction is too often glossed over by those who find that the end,
which is necessarily value-laden, is justified by the means, usually
judicial overreaching. However, the integrity of our tripartite governmental structure simply must be elevated over the expediency of a
desired result. A contrary approach leads to judicial legislating such as
that of Roe v.Wade,' which robs the people of their ability to discuss
and decide controversial issues for themselves, and to "truisms" such as
that offered by one lawyer: "I don't want to know what the law is, [sic]
I want to know who the judge is."7
The presidential election debacle in Florida epitomizes judicial
overreaching in order to obtain a particular result. 8 While most

3. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam Classic ed., 1982).
4. Consider that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its progeny
changed the public school system, housing patterns, and, to a degree, family life based on
the amount of time children spend riding buses past their neighborhood schools to a school
miles away. Likewise, United Steelworkers of America v.Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), and
Johnson v. TransportationAgency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), rewrote the language of Title VII
to approve of voluntary affirmative action plans by employers using race, gender, religion,
or national origin as the basis for employment decisions. Each of these cases has shaped
racial relations in American society.
5. See, e.g., Anna Quindlen, The Best of the Supremes, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 6, 2000, at 92
(referring to decisions of the Warren Court when stating, "Its proudest history is a history
of daring the unpopular to benefit the unrepresented").
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). It is worth noting that this decision by the high Court has
hardly had a decisive effect; nearly thirty years later, the Court is still struggling with the
results of its activism: "The issue of abortion is one of the most contentious and
controversial in contemporary American Society. It presents extraordinarily difficult
questions that, as the Court recognizes, involve 'virtually irreconcilable points of view.'"
Stenberg v. Carhart,530 U.S. 914, _ (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
7.

RoY M. COHN, LAWYER'S WIT AND WISDOM: QUOTATIONS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION,

IN BRIEF 75 (Bruce Nash & Allan Zullo eds. 1995)
8. The integrity of the Florida court's decisions must be scrutinized independently of
one's personal political affinity. The fact that some would embrace or reject the decisions
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Americans watched the goings-on as a fascinating, or frightening,

political battle, those in the legal profession understood the serious
implications of the court's being drawn into that battle. The opinions of
the Supreme Court of Florida-once stripped of their ramifications for
the presidential candidates-were simply unjustifiable as good legal

decisions. The court issued two significant opinions during the thirty-six
day election: Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard v. Harris, ("Palm
Beach")? in which the court suspended a statutory deadline as an
exercise of its "equitable" power, and Gore v. Harris,'° in which the
court ordered a statewide manual recount of undervotes for presidential
candidates." Neither opinion bears close scrutiny. 2 In their apparent haste to reach a desired result, the justices departed from traditional
standards of review, gave mere lip service to canons of statutory
construction, clearly departed from legal precedents, and reached a
conclusion antithetical to their purported purpose of ensuring the
integrity of the rights of Florida voters. In so doing, the court abdicated
its limited role in the operation of our government-a role that does not
include choosing a President. 3
II.

BACKGROUND OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN FLORIDA

Elections are, by definition, political events and can become ugly,
particularly national elections in which the sum expended by the

based solely on whether they favor or disfavor one's political candidate merely illustrates
my point about the ends justifying the means as a rationale for judicial activism.
9. 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000). The revised version of this opinion in response to the
United States Supreme Court's order vacating the original was issued December 11, 2000,
three days after the court ordered a statewide manual recount of undervotes.
10. 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000). This decision clearly ignored the fact that the Supreme
Court had vacated its first opinion.
11. Undervotes refer to ballots on which no vote is registered either because the voter
chose not to vote for any candidate or because the voter erred, making his or her choice
indiscernible. In Florida the rate of presidential undervotes is about two percent. See Jeff
Kunerth et al., Vote Never Had Chance: Ballots and Laws Were Confusing, Poll Workers
Weren't Well-Trained, and Voters Were Careless, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 17, 2000, at Al.
12. Because the court's decision in Gore was merely an extension of its unsound
reasoning and contortion of statutory language in Palm Beach, this Comment focuses on
the latter case.
13. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. -,
121
S. Ct. 525 (2000), has rendered ineffectual the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida
regarding the outcome of the election. However, this decision merely refocused the issue
of judicial activism from the state court to the federal court. See, e.g., Evan Thomas &
Michael Isikoff, The Truth Behind the Pillars,NEWSWEEK, Dec. 25, 2000/Jan. 1, 2001, at
46.
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candidates is astronomical and the stakes are very high. 4 As in every
other state in the nation, Florida voters went to the polls on November
7, 2000, to cast their votes for their preferred candidates for various
political offices, including that of President of the United States. 5
Because the result of the presidential race was so close in Florida," a
17
statewide automatic recount was conducted according to statute,
yielding the same ultimate result: George W. Bush received more votes
for President than did Al Gore.' 8 Worth noting is that the "automatic"
recount can be waived by the defeated candidate who requests in writing
that the recount not be conducted. 9
On November 9, 2000, the Florida Democratic Executive Committee,
pursuant to state law, 2° protested the election results and requested a

manual recount in Palm Beach, Miami-Dade, Broward, and Volusia
Counties, 21 all of which are heavily populated and heavily Democratic

14. An estimated $3 billion was spent on both the presidential and congressional races
in this past election. See Election Spending Makes Quantum Leap, THE WASHINGTON POST,

reprinted in AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 6, 2000, at A3.
15. The number of Floridians who went to the polls but did not vote for a presidential
candidate is 180,127, slightly higher than the national average of 2%. See Kunerth, supra
note 11. However, in the 1996 presidential election, 142,678 ballots registered no vote for
president, and voter turnout was much lower in 1996 than in 2000. In 1992, the total was
127,367. See Opposition Brief, Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1773459, at *2 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct.
Nov. 30, 2000).
16. George W. Bush received 2,909,135 votes and Al Gore received 2,907,351, a
difference of 1,784 votes. See Palm Beach, 772 So. 2d at 1225.
17. FLA. STAT. ch. 102, § 141(4) (2000). It reads in part:
If the returns for any office reflect that a candidate was defeated or eliminated
by one-half of a percent or less of the votes cast for such office, . . . the board
responsible for certifying the results of the vote on such race or measure shall
order a recount of the votes cast with respect to such office ....
If there is a
discrepancy between the returns and the counters of the machines or the
tabulation of the ballots cast, the counters of such machines or the tabulation of
the ballots cast shall be presumed correct and such votes shall be canvassed
accordingly.
18. The result of the statutorily mandated recount showed that George W. Bush
received 327 more votes than did Al Gore. This number does not reflect the addition of
overseas votes in favor of either candidate.
19. FLA. STAT. ch. 102, § 141(4) (2000). It reads in part, "A recount need not be ordered
... if the candidate ...
defeated ... request[s] in writing that a recount not be made."
20. FLA. STAT. ch. 102, § 166(4)(a) (2000). It reads in part, "Any candidate whose name
appeared on the ballot ... or any political party whose candidates' names appeared on the
ballot may file a written request with the county canvassing board for a manual recount.
The written request shall contain a statement of the reason the manual recount is being
requested."
21. See Amended Brief of Intervenors, Palm Beach, 2000 WL 1724509, at *2 (Fla. Nov.
16, 2000).
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and which Gore won by a sizable margin.22 The selection of these four
counties was clearly a political maneuver, as could be expected in a
political battle of this magnitude, because the fact that former Vice
President Gore won those precincts and counties was undisputed.
Instead, the reason for the protest was the closeness of the election

outcome. 2' This was not the first close election America has ever had;
it was not even the closest. 24 However, it was the first time in Ameri25
can history that a presidential candidate requested a recount of votes.
What is more, it was the first time in Florida history that a request for
a recount was granted merely because the election was close and the
Further, neither
machine recounts reflected different outcomes. 2'
undervoting nor overvoting is a new occurrence, as the various Supervisors of Elections acknowledged.2" Yet, each of the four county canvassing boards decided to exercise its discretion and grant the Democratic
Party's request for an initial manual recount.28

22. In Broward County, Gore received 209,239 more votes than did Bush. In MiamiDade, the difference was 39,246 votes. Palm Beach County resulted in 116,099 more votes
for Gore than for Bush, and in Volusia County, Gore received 14,849 more votes than Bush
received. See Complaint, Rogers v. Elections Canvassing Comm'n, 2000 WL 1694382, at
*4 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Nov. 9, 2000).
23. See Amended Brief of Intervenors, Palm Beach, 2000 WL 1724509, at *2.
24. Other close presidential elections occurred in 1824, 1876, 1880, and 1960. Herbert
L. Levine, The Closest Elections of the Past, ELECTION 2000-WHO REALLY WON? 1:21
(2000). During the latter year, despite serious allegations of voter fraud in Illinois and
much urging to contest the results, Richard Nixon conceded the election to John F.
Kennedy. See Richard Reeves, Op. Ed., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2000, at A33. The closest
election occurred in 1800 and resulted in a tie between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr
with each man receiving 73 electoral votes (three other candidates received between 65 and
1 electoral votes). Levine, supra.
25. See Levine, supra note 24.
26. Attorney General Bob Butterworth admitted in oral argument that no manual
recount had ever been conducted in Florida because of voter error resulting in undervotes
that had to be counted. Transcript of Oral Argument, Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd., 2000 WL 1763817, at *15 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2000). See, e.g., Broward County
Canvassing Bd. v. Hogan, 607 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Adams v.
Canvassing Bd. of Broward County, 421 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (rejecting
the argument that a difference in totals of two counts demonstrates unreliability and
noting that "[p]art of the purpose of the protest and contest provisions of the election code
is to effect a speedy resolution of such conflicts with minimal disruption of the electoral
process"). Justice Anstead, now of the Florida Supreme Court, was a sitting justice in the
fourth judicial circuit and concurred in that case.
27. See, e.g., Kevin Valine, Think Every Vote Counts? You'd Better Think Again,
SAIRSOTA HERALD-TRIB., Nov. 16, 2000, at Al; Kunerth, supra note 11.
28. The decisions of two canvassing boards are rather suspect. Volusia County's
machine recount inexplicably resulted in 320 previously undiscovered ballots. A telephone
call from Attorney General Butterworth, Gore's campaign chairman in Florida, resulted in
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The Democratic Party selected the three precincts in each county
whose ballots would be hand counted,29 and all were heavily Democratic.30 Following this initial manual recount, each of the four counties3 12
voted to conduct full manual recounts under Section 102.166(5)(c),
although the methods by which they concluded that the outcome of the
election could be affected were not at all clear. Rather, the number of
net votes that Gore gained from the most heavily Democratic voting
precincts in the most heavily Democratic counties could be considered
negligible."3 Whether the net gains for each county were accurately

a manual recount, which in turn somehow resulted in the omission of 264 previously
counted absentee ballots. See David Tell, The Gore Coup, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Nov.
27, 2000. See also Appellants' Statement of Status of State Court Actions Related to
Electors, Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1720090, at,*2 (11th Cir. Nov. 16, 2000) (suggesting that
the difference between Volusia County's November 14 certified totals and its initial
certified totals was not entirely attributable to the manual recount) [hereinafter
"Appellants' Statement of Status"]. Palm Beach County's machine recount resulted in 45%
of Gore's total statewide gain in the results of the automatic recount. See Tell, supra.
29. FLA. STAT. ch. 102, § 166(4)(d) (2000). It provides in part: "The manual recount
must include at least three precincts and at least 1 percent of the total votes cast for such
candidate or issue ....
The person who requested the recount shall choose three precincts
to be recounted."
30. See Opposition Brief, Gore, 2000 WL 1773459, at *2, *10, *12 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Nov.
30, 2000) (noting that handpicking certain precincts that voted for Gore ten to one over
Bush could not be extrapolated over Miami-Dade county because, countywide, Gore
received 52% of the votes and Bush received 46%).
31. The Miami-Dade County Canvassing Board voted on November 14 to conduct a
limited manual recount of three precincts (rejecting the Democrat's request for a manual
recount of only the undervoted ballots) and concluded that a full manual recount was not
warranted. However, on November 17, the Board reversed its decision and began a full
recount on November 20. After determining it could not possibly count all of the ballots
by the Florida court's new deadline, the Board voted on November 22 to count only the
undervotes and to count them in the tabulation room, which did not allow for observers.
A group of media representatives filed a written protest, and the Board voted that
afternoon to suspend the recounts and rely on its November 14 returns. See Opposition
Brief, Gore, 2000 WL 1773459, at *2-4.
32. Section 102.166(5) reads:
If the manual recount indicates an error in the vote tabulation which could affect
the outcome of the election, the county canvassing board shall: (a) [clorrect the
error and recount the remaining precincts with the vote tabulation system; (b)
[riequest the Department of State to verify the tabulation software; or (c)
[mlanually recount all ballots.
Id. (emphasis added). The Miami-Dade County Canvassing Board selected the first option
and timely notified the Secretary of State on November 9 of its amended results of the
automatic recount. See Nov. 22, 2000, Hearing Transcript at 24-30, cited in Opposition
Brief, Gore, 2000 WL 1773459, at *3, *11 n.2.
33. Gore gained 4 votes in Broward County, 6 in Miami-Dade, and 19 in Palm Beach.
See Palm Beach, 2000 WL 1725343, at *2; Appellants' Statement of Status, Touchston,
2000 WL 1720090, at *2.
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extrapolated across the respective counties to suggest that the results of
the initial count could affect the outcome of the election was shown to be
doubtful during the election contest. 34 For example, in Palm Beach

County, the Canvassing Board "recovered" 19 votes for Gore from the
4,620 votes counted, which was roughly one percent of the total votes.
The Board erroneously concluded that a full recount of the entire county
would show a gain for Gore of 1,900 votes. 5 But this clearly ignores
the fact that the initial 19 vote gain was obtained in the most heavily
Democratic precincts and this gain could not accurately be presumed to
hold in the Republican-leaning precincts.
The Palm Beach Canvassing Board sought an advisory opinion from
the Division of Elections to determine whether it could lawfully conduct
a manual recount based on the discrepancy between the result of the
machine counts and that of the initial hand count.3" The Division of
Elections responded that manual recounts should be conducted only if
the voting system had malfunctioned.3 7 However, the Attorney General
of Florida issued a conflicting advisory opinion to Palm Beach,3" despite
the fact that his authority to issue the opinion seemed doubtful in light
of the legislature's explicit grant of jurisdiction to the Department of
State's Division of Elections over election matters 39 and notwithstanding both his refusal to entertain requests for his opinion in previous
election matters 40 and his disclaimer published on his official website.4 '
Because of delays in deciding to recount and then in actually starting
the recount with all canvassing board members present, Palm Beach and
Broward Counties informed the Secretary of State that they would be

34. See Proceedings: In re: Contest Trial, Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1802941, at *108
(Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 2, 2000). Judge Charles Burton, a member of the Palm Beach
Canvassing Board, testified of his dissatisfaction with the "method-or lack thereof-employed by the Board in determining that the outcome of the election could be
affected and that a full manual recount should be conducted. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id. at *105
37. See Opinion DE 00-13, reproduced in Supplement to Emergency Petition for
Extraordinary Relief, Harris v. Circuit Court Judges, 2000 WL 1716219, at *14-15 (Fla.
Nov. 15, 2000).
38. See id. at *22-24.
39. See FLA. STAT. ch. 106, § 23(2) (2000).
40. See, e.g., Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 93048 (1993), reproducedin Supplement to Emergency
Petition for Extraordinary Relief, Harris,2000 WL 1716219, at *20, Ex. F (referring letters
requesting advisory opinions from the Attorney General on election matters to the Division
of Elections).
41. See Frequently Asked QuestionsAbout Attorney General Opinions (visited Dec. 12,

2000) <http://legal.firn.edu/opinions/faq.hml#when>.
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unable to meet the statutory deadline for submitting the results of their
manual recounts.4 2 Palm Beach filed a petition with the state supreme
court ostensibly for the purpose of declaring which of the two advisory
opinions 43 regarding the legality of conducting manual recounts based
on voter error was correct."' Meanwhile, the Gore campaign, along
with Volusia and Palm Beach Counties, appealed an order by Judge
Terry Lewis that the Secretary of State had complied with Florida law
in refusing to accept late-filed returns by four counties."'
The Supreme Court of Florida ordered a stay preventing the Secretary
of State from certifying the results of the election and allowing the
manual recounts to continue. 46 After hearing oral arguments, which
were televised, the court issued its highly questionable opinion, in which
it determined that manual recounts were permissible in the absence of
any showing of fraud, misconduct by election officials, or machine
malfunction and that the statutory deadline need not be observed.47
The United States Supreme Court vacated this opinion and remanded
the case to the Florida court, instructing the state court to explain the
basis for its opinion, the extent to which the court relied upon the state
constitution in rendering its decision, and the extent to which, if any, the

42. Broward County did not begin the initial 1% recount until November 13. The
Board first voted not to conduct a full manual recount then reversed its decision, but
because a board member was on vacation, it did not begin a full recount until November
15. See Petitioner Broward County Canvassing Bd.'s Initial Brief on the Merits, Palm
Beach v. Harris, 2000 WL 1726646, at *3 (Fla. Nov. 18, 2000). Likewise, Palm Beach did
not begin its initial recount until November 11. It voted on November 12 to conduct a full
recount and did not begin that count until the evening of November 16. Miami-Dade
County did not even meet to decide whether to conduct a full manual recount until
November 14, at which time it determined that a full recount was unnecessary. Latest
Developments in the PresidentialRecount, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 16, 2000. Three days later,
the Board met again and decided to begin a full recount. Miami-Dade County Democratic
Party v. Miami-Dade County Canvassing Bd., 2000 WL 1790424, at *1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
Nov. 22, 2000). The recount began on November 19. Dade Decides to Recount: Process
Could Take Weeks, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 18, 2000.
43. Compare Manual Recount Procedures and Partial Certification of County Returns,
DE 00-13, and Deadline for Certification of County Results, DE 00-10, Nov. 13, 2000, cited
in Supplement to Emergency Petition for Extraordinary Relief, Harris, 2000 WL 1716219,
at *14-16, Exs. D-E with Op. Att'y Gen. 00-65, Nov. 14, 2000, id. at *22-25, Ex. G.
44. Emergency Petition for Extraordinary Writ, Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd.
v. Harris, 2000 WL 1717643, at *2 (Fla. Nov. 16, 2000).
45. Order Denying Emergency Motion to Compel Compliance with and for Enforcement
of Injunction, McDermott v. Harris, 2000 WL 1714590, at *1 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Nov. 17,
2000).
46. Stay Order, Palm Beach, 2000 WL 1716505, at *1 (Fla. Nov. 17, 2000).
47. Palm Beach, 772 So. 2d at 1237-40 (Fla. 2000).
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court considered 3 U.S.C. § 54' in its deliberations.49 Astoundingly,
the Florida Supreme Court virtually ignored this directive, issuing its
revised and sanitized version of its initial opinion on December 11,50
three days after it issued an order to conduct a statewide manual
recount of undervotes in the presidential election 51-a decision that
shocked even the Gore attorneys who had booked their flights home.52
As a context for the court battles between the two politicians, worth
noting is that Republicans sought solace in the federal court system to
have the manual recounts stopped. This was a highly criticized
maneuver because of the view among many conservatives that states'
rights have been largely eviscerated by the pervasive expansion of the
federal police power. 3 The Democratic Party, on the other hand,
engaged in political fratricide, crucifying Theresa LePore, a Democrat
and the Supervisor of Elections for Palm Beach County, for designing
the "butterfly ballot" that was said to confuse so many voters.54 The
Democratic Party filed suit against Palm Beach55 and Miami-Dade'
Counties to force the former Board to use a more liberal standard in
counting ballots as registering votes and to force the latter to conduct a
full recount. At least three television networks provided around-theclock coverage of the chaos unfolding during the manual recounts. 7

48. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). It reads in part: "If any State shall have provided, by laws
enacted prior to [election] day ... , for its final determination of any controversy or contest
concerning the appointment of ...

the electors of such State ...

such determination ...

shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes."
49. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S ....
121 S. Ct. 471, 475
(2000).
50. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 2000 WL 1805408, at *1 (Fla. Dec.
11, 2000).
51. Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1801246, at *1 (Fla. Dec. 8, 2000).
52. See Evan Thomas & Michael Isikoff, Settling Old Scores in the Swamp, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 18, 2000, at 36; Kenneth T. Walsh, Confusion Reigns, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Dec. 18, 2000, at 21 (referring to the Florida Supreme Court's decision as "extraordinary,
astonishing, historic, bizarre").
53. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Siegel v. LePore, 2000 WL
1694377 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2000).
54. See, e.g., Rick Bragg & Dana Canedy, Anger and ChagrinAfter an Oops on a Ballot,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2000, at Al.
55. See Florida Democratic Party v. Palm Beach Canvassing Bd., CLO0-11078AH (Fla.
15th Dist. Ct. Nov. 15, 2000), cited in Emergency Petition for Extraordinary Relief, 2000
WL 1716222, at *2-3 (Fla. Nov. 15, 2000).
56. See Miami-Dade County Democratic Party v. Miami-Dade County Canvassing Bd.,
773 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 2000).
57. CNN, C-SPAN, and FOXNEWS each recorded the goings-on of the various
canvassing boards, the protestors, and the courts throughout the 36 days during which the
result of the election was disputed. For the viewers who watched the counting procedures
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Each political party was creating a mantra and wrapping itself in the
flag to garner public support.
Perhaps the oddest thing about this election is that absolutely nothing
new happened during the election itself: Voters went to the polls and
cast their votes, and some of the ballots were discarded as invalid
because voters did not follow directions or chose not to vote for a8
presidential candidate. It has happened in every election in Florida.
It happens in every election in every state across the nation.59 The
difference is that in this election the Florida Supreme Court intervened
to create a new right for some Florida voters: the right of voters who
either cannot or do not follow instructions to have certain ballots
inspected by hand in search of some undefined indication of that voter's
intent. Other voters had their constitutional right to vote nullified by
this same action: Those who chose not to vote for a presidential
candidate but whose ballot may have indicated a scratch mark or
indentation near a candidate's name quite likely voted for a candidate
anyway, at least in some counties.
III.

THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT'S RESULT-ORIENTED DECISION

The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Palm Beach exemplifies a
court caught up in a "means-justify-the-ends" attitude. s By flexing its
equitable muscle, the court suspended a statutory deadline, stripped the
Chief Elections ,Officer of her ability to do her job, reallocated the time
between the statutory election protest and contest provisions, ignored
the usual standards of review, ignored pertinent facts and legal
questions, repudiated prior law, and reached an illogical conclusion, the
result of which was a remedy whose woeful inadequacy demonstrated
the fallacies in the court's reasoning. In Gore v. Harris, the court
compounded its earlier offense, clearly ignoring the intervening
command of the United States Supreme Court to tread cautiously, and
ordered a statewide manual recount of undervotes in search of the "true
intent" of the voters of Florida."1 The process established was funda-

and listened to the announcements of new standards for counting, the whole process was
maddening. Judge Robert Rosenberg, a member of the Broward County Canvassing Board,
actually used a magnifying glass in his search for voter intent.
58. See Kunerth, supra note 11.
59. See David Ho, More Than 2 Million Ballots Nationwide Not Counted Toward
Presidency,AP Online (Nov. 28, 2000).
60. 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000). This is the court's first opinion. The revised opinion
issued in response to the United States Supreme Court's order is largely irrelevant, except
to note the obvious omissions of the substantial references to the Florida Constitution. See
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 2000 WL 1805408 (Fla. Dec. 11, 2000).
61. 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000).
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mentally flawed and contradicted the court's purported desire to ensure
that Florida voters would not be disenfranchised by failing to resolve its
election contest in time to avail itself of the federal "safe harbor"
provision for states' electors. 2 Three justices acknowledged the folly
of the majority's order and foreshadowed the reaction of the United
States Supreme Court to this astonishing show of defiance by the state
court in the face of the high court's reprimand.63 Because the first of
these two opinions paved the way for the chaotic outcome and created
the initial outcry against judicial activism, it is the focus of analysis.
Much of the argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
on December 1, 2000, centered on what the Florida Supreme Court had
relied upon for its ruling in Palm Beach.64 If the lower court had
merely been engaged in "plain vanilla" statutory interpretation, the
Supreme Court would lack jurisdiction in the absence of a federal
question. However, if the state court relied on its constitution to change
state law after the presidential election, the Court would have jurisdiction to consider whether the lower court's action was consistent with
federal law.65 Although the state court's suspension of the statutory
deadline for certifying the election results received much attention as an
unprecedented act and as a possible violation of either the federal
Constitution or 3 U.S.C. § 5, the court's initial act of determining that
manual recounts could be conducted merely because the election was
close and because some voters may not have followed instructions has
the most significance in many ways, because it was a departure from
prior law and practice in virtually every respect.
The Florida Supreme Court, sua sponte, enjoined the Secretary of
66
State from certifying the results of the election according to law.

Injunctive relief is appropriate only where the legal remedy is inadequate, and Florida's election code clearly provides for an election contest
to dispute the results of a certified election. 7 The political implications
of certifying an election are clear: Once a candidate is declared the
certified winner, the losing candidate-aside from adopting the status of

62.

See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).

63. Chief Justice Wells dissented as did Justices Harding and Shaw. Gore v. Harris,
2000 WL 1801246, at *18-32 (Wells, C.J., dissenting) (Fla. Dec. 8, 2000).
64. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Bd., 2000 WL 1763817 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2000).
65. See id.
66. Stay Order, Palm Beach, 2000 WL 1716505, at *1.
67. See FLA. STAT. ch. 102, § 168 (2000). See also State v. Latham, 169 So. 597 (Fla.
1936) ("Statutory election contest proceeding affords sufficient remedy by which circuit
court can investigate and determine not only legality of votes cast, but can correct any
inaccuracies in count of ballots.").
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"loser"-also faces the heavier legal burden of overturning the election
results, which are presumptively correct.68 While the supreme court
claimed to be interested in protecting the "preeminent right" of the
citizens of Florida in having their votes count, 9 the court essentially
ignored the procedures established by the state legislature for ensuring
the accuracy and security of the citizens' votes-procedures that place
tremendous responsibility upon election officials to provide the means of
accurate voting processes so far as those processes depend upon forces
outside the voter.
The Florida Supreme Court considered two issues in Palm Beach: (1)
whether the Division of Election's determination that Section 102.166(5)
authorized full manual recounts in the event of machine error but not
voter error was clearly erroneous, and (2) whether the Secretary of State
abused her discretion in refusing to accept late-filed election returns on
the basis that the canvassing boards were unable to finish manual
recounts before the statutory deadline.7" The first issue was raised in
a petition by Palm Beach7 ' that sought an advisory opinion from the
court determining which of two conflicting advisory opinions7 2 received
from the Secretary of State and the Attorney General regarding the
meaning of Section 102.166(5) was correct. The petition created
jurisdictional problems for the court,73 which the court handily sidestepped in Palm Beach by dismissing the original petition and claiming
the issue was presented by the parties in the case before it.7 4 Notwithstanding that the court lacked original jurisdiction to issue an advisory
opinion in the first instance and that the court did not have to reach the
issue had it upheld the plain language of the statute imposing the

68. Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 268 (Fla. 1975).
69. Palm Beach, 772 So. 2d at 1236-38.
70. Id. at 1228-30.
71. Emergency Petition for Extraordinary Writ, Palm Beach, 2000 WL 1717643 (Fla.
Nov. 16, 2000).
72. See supra note 43.
73. The Florida Constitution limits the supreme court's jurisdiction to issue advisory
opinions to a very few specific instances. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 1(c), 10, 15 (2000). The
court has construed its ability to advise under these provisions quite narrowly. See, e.g.,
In re Advisory Opinion To Governor Request of August 28, 388 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1980).
Beyond these limited circumstances, courts are without authority to issue advisory
opinions. See LaBella v. Food Fair, Inc., 406 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 1981) (quoting
William v. Howard, 329 So. 2d 277, 283 (Fla. 1976)).
74. The court dispensed with this difficulty in a footnote, dismissing the troublesome
petition on the basis that it could decide the issue in the case sub judice and that it had,
in its stay, found "'no legal impediment' to the manual recounts continuing" in its
statement on November 16. The court offered no reasoning for this conclusion. Palm
Beach, 772 So. 2d at 1225 n.1.
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certification deadline, the court got it wrong and usurped the authority
of the Secretary of State in the process.
Misconstruing "Errorin Vote Tabulation"

A.

In Palm Beach the court claimed the Division's interpretation of
Section 102.166 to allow recounts for machine malfunctions was
"contrary to law" because it "contravene[d] the plain meaning of [the
statute]."75 Yet, the court skimped on its explanation of how the
Division's construction offended the statute's plain meaning-and for
good reasons. First, the statute's plain language clearly supports the
Division's interpretation. Second, even if the plain language did not
clearly support this construction, the resulting ambiguity in the phrase
"error in the vote tabulation" would result in deference to the agency's
reasonable interpretation. Therefore, the ground for overturning the
administrative interpretation disappears. Finally, the court's reasoning
behind its construction of the statute's "plain meaning" borders on
nonsensical. On the other hand, the interpretation given by the Division
was not only reasonable, it was consistent with the statute's plain
language, the entire statute for election protests, existing case law, and
the purpose of the statute. Therefore, the Division's interpretation
should have been upheld.7"
The Florida Supreme Court erred in holding that the Division's
construction of Section 102.166(5) contradicted that statute's plain
meaning. The exact opposite is true. Section 102.166(5) authorizes
canvassing boards to conduct manual recounts as one of three options if
the initial manual recount conducted pursuant to Section 102.166(4)
"indicates an error in the vote tabulation which could affect the outcome
of the election.""7 The Division of Elections construed the statute to
mean that manual recounts should be conducted only when the voting
system, or the machine or method of casting and processing voted
ballots,7" malfunctioned and not when voters erred in failing to follow
directions.7" The court rejected this interpretation, holding that such a

75. Id. at 1228. This claim is ironic considering the court's conclusion that under
§ 102.112, the Secretary of State must accept late returns except in two extreme
circumstances, directly contravening the plain language of that statute. Id. at 1237.
76. Although Katherine Harris, the Secretary of State, received the brunt of much
criticism and personal attacks (among the derogatory names were "hack," "commissar," and
"crook"), it is the Division of Elections that issues advisory opinions, and Laurence Clayton
Roberts, Director, authored the ones at issue. See Opinions DE 00-10, DE 00-13, Harris,
2000 WL 1716219, at *14-16, Exs. D-E.

77. See FLA. STAT. ch. 102, § 166(5) (2000).
78.
79.

See id. ch. 97, § 021(30) (2000) (defining "voting system").
See Opinion DE 00-13, supra note 37.
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construction contradicted the statute's plain language because the
statute "provides a remedy for any type of mistake made in tabulating
ballots." s° Thus, according to the court, the Division's opinion unnecessarily limits the statute's application."
However, the statute provides for mistakes in tabulatingballots, not
in casting votes. 2 The statute does not refer to an error "due to the
manner in which a ballot has been marked or punched" or to any other
type of voter error.8 3 It refers to the vote tabulation, which occurs by
machine in sixty-six of Florida's sixty-seven counties." An error in
vote tabulation can occur in only one of two ways in these sixty-six
counties: The machine malfunctions, or the election officials err in
transferring the vote totals from the machine counters to the certificates
of return as established in great detail in Section 101.54.85 The latter
is highly unlikely to be the source of an "error in vote tabulation"
because of the numerous procedural safeguards required by the
governing statute.8 6 What is more, if the latter process still produces
an error, Section 102.166(3)87 provides for the canvassing boards to
correct the error.
For the court's interpretation of "error in the vote tabulation" to have
any meaningful basis, one must assume that the machine's failure to
read invalid ballots is an "error."8 But this assumption defies logic.
If the statute did refer, as the court concluded, to the machine's inability
to read improperly cast ballots, the bulk of the election code would be
rendered mere surplusage. No voting machine exists that can read an

80. Palm Beach, 772 So. 2d at 229.
81. Id.

82. See FLA. STAT. ch. 102, § 166(5) (2000).
83. Palm Beach, 772 So. 2d at 1228.
84. Union County is the only county still voting by paper ballot and manual count. See
Kunerth, supra note 11.
85. See FLA. STAT. ch. 101, § 54 (2000).
86. Id. For example, two persons are employed to read the total number of votes for
a candidate or issue from the machine counter with one person reading and the other
ensuring the numbers read are accurate. Likewise, one person writes down the numbers
called out while another looks on to ensure accuracy. These individuals switch roles and
repeat the process until each person has performed each role. Id.
87. See FLA. STAT. ch. 102, § 166(3) (2000) (providing three ways for canvassing boards
to ensure the accuracy of the returns from the precincts based upon the kind of voting
system used).

88. The court had no record before it and sought no evidence to explain what, other
than voter error, might cause the discrepancy in the machine counts. But numerous
explanations for the discrepancy aside from rejection of valid legal votes were provided in

the contest trial before the second circuit court. See Proceedings: In re: Contest Trial, 2000
WL 1802941, at *19-54 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 2, 2000).
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improperly marked ballot. Manual recounts-assuming they are, in fact,
accurate, which is an assumption leaving much to be desired by those
who have either had to count large numbers of anything or who watched
the televised recounts proceed-would be necessary for every election.89
Machines would be obsolete. This result could not be the intention of a
legislature that required voting machines to be used in counties with
populations exceeding 260,000.90 Nor is it consistent with an election
code that, in the event of a discrepancy between machine counts and
election returns, requires election officials to presume the machine count
is correct. 9'
Additionally, the court had to have assumed that the machine's
inability to read certain ballots resulted in actual votes not being
counted. However, this assumption is just that-an assumption. Had
the court required any kind of evidentiary hearing, it would, no doubt,
have discovered exactly what the contest trial before Judge N. Sanders
Sauls revealed: Ballots can have marks, indentations, and even various
versions of "hanging" chads that are not produced by the voter at all.92
Nor can a canvassing board, after the fact, determine with certainty
whether those particular "indications of voter intent" are actually
that.93 All of these factors militate against the court's conclusion that
an election protest should be conducted in the absence of some threshold
showing of a reason to conduct that count other than one of the
candidate's belief that he would win.
What is perhaps most significant in light of the court's attention to
voters' intent is that the election code specifically addresses voter error.
Sections 101.011(5) 94 and 101.5608(2)(b) 95 provide voters with an

89. Statisticians seem to agree that every count will produce a different number. See,
e.g., Gina Kolata, In Research, Recounts Are Norm, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2000, at A24.
90. See FLA. STAT. ch. 101, § 36. It reads in pertinent part: "In counties above 260,000
population ...which have adopted the use of voting machines or electronic or electromechanical voting, it shall be mandatory for all municipalities in such counties to use such
voting machines or devices in all elections."

91. Section 102.166 itself requires this presumption as do Sections 101.141 and
101.5614.
92. See generally Proceedings:

In re:

Contest Trial, 2000 WL 1802941, at *19-54

(revealing Gore's own expert witnesses' testimony that other causes of undervote besides
voter's error were likely).
93. See id. at *58.
94. FLA. STAT. ch. 101, § 011(5) (2000). It provides in pertinent part: "Any elector who
shall, by mistake, spoil a ballot so he or she cannot vote the ballot may return it to the
inspectors .... In no case shall an elector be furnished with more than three ballots."
95. FLA. STAT. ch. 101, § 5608(2)(b) (2000). It reads in pertinent part: "Any voter who
spoils his or her ballot or makes an error may return the ballot to the election official and
secure another ballot, except that in no case shall a voter be furnished more than three
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opportunity to be furnished at least three ballots in their attempt to cast
their votes correctly. Section 101.011(2)9" delineates which voter errors
are "acceptable" when paper ballots are used and which voter errors are
not. In addition, the legislature has provided multiple safeguards to
guard against voter error, including publishing sample ballots in
newspapers, mailing sample ballots to registered voters, and posting at
least two sample ballots at each polling place," as well as furnishing
all electors instructions to follow when voting.98 Moreover, the voters
choose their voting systems to the extent the county commissioners, who
are themselves elected, decide on which voting system to employ.99
When the court did refer to other portions of the election code to
support its conclusion that manual recounts are authorized for voter
errors, the court selected poorly and ignored those portions of the
selected statutes that undermined its conclusion. For example, the court
relied on language in Sections 101.5614(5)-(6) to reach a finding that the
legislature intended manual recounts in search of voter intent when
voters erred in casting their ballots.'0 ° However, this portion of the
code provides for the situation in which, through no fault of the voter,
the ballots are unreadable by the machine. When this error occurs, the
statute requires the election officials at each voting precinct to make
duplicates of ballots that are "damaged or defective" or to count those
ballots manually, depending on which procedure is "best suited to the
system used."' 01
More importantly, this statute states that any

ballots."
96. FLA. STAT. ch. 101, § 011(2) (2000). It states,
No paper ballot shall be voided or declared invalid ...[because] the ballot is
marked other than with an "X," so long as there is a clear indication thereon...
that the person marking such ballot has made a definite choice, and provided
further, that the mark placed on the ballot.., shall be located in the blank space
on the ballot opposite such candidate's name.
Id. (emphasis added).
97. See FLA. STAT. ch. 101, § 20 (2000).
98. See FLA. STAT. ch. 101, §§ 031, 5611 (2000). See also Proceedings: In re: Contest
Trial, Gore, 2000 WL 1802941, at *63-64 (reciting the instructions on the voting booths
used in Palm Beach County).
99. See FLA. STAT. ch. 101, § 32 (2000). See also Kunerth, supra note 11 (quoting the
Supervisor of Elections for Broward County as repeatedly asking the County Commission
to buy new voting equipment to replace the punch-card machines).
100. Palm Beach, 772 So. 2d at 1228-29.
101. FLA. STAT. ch. 101, § 5614(5)-(6). It reads in part:
If any ballot card of the type for which the offices and measures are not printed
directly on the card is damaged or defective so that it cannot properly be counted
by the automatic tabulating equipment, a true duplicate copy shall be made of the
damaged ballot card in the presence of witnesses and substituted for the damaged
ballot.
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duplicate ballot "shall not include the invalid votes."" 2 Instead, the
ballot is valid with respect to "those names which are properly
marked." °3 Moreover, this entire process occurs prior to any election
protest. Thus, the very statutory provision the court calls upon to
support its conclusion actually contradicts that conclusion.
The same is true for the court's use of Section 102.141, which instructs
canvassing boards to examine the returns to determine whether they
accurately reflect the vote count."0 4 Once again, though, the court
misrepresented the text of the statute. Section 102.141 provides for a
recount of all ballots from a particular precinct if the returns from that
precinct are missing, if there are omissions on the returns, or if there is
an obvious error on the returns.10 5 But before the Board canvasses
those returns, it is to inspect the machine counters or tabulations, and,
if a discrepancy exists between the returns and the counters or
tabulations, the latter is presumed correct. 106 The votes are canvassed
based on the machine counts. This provision, too, undercuts the court's
conclusion that the legislature clearly intended to provide for a means
of rectifying voter error through manual recounts. If the legislature
provided that in other instances in which a discrepancy exists in the
reported vote totals the machines were to be presumed correct and that
machine recounts were authorized to rectify any discrepancy, why would
it authorize manual recounts in the absence of an error by the machines
or elections officials?
Thus, the use of "error in vote tabulation" can be read consistently
with the language of the statute and the election scheme only as either
an error in the functioning of the vote tabulation equipment or in the
human process of reading the numbers from the machine equipment and
transferring those numbers to the certificates of return, in which case
the machine results are presumptively correct. There simply is no
support anywhere in the election code for the notion that "error in vote
tabulation" refers to voter error in casting ballots. Any interpretation
of this sort must be found outside the code.
Clearly then, the Division's interpretation is not contrary to the
statute's plain meaning. Had the court had any lingering doubts,
however, these could easily have been resolved by considering the
statutory history of Section 102.166. Section 102.166 was amended in
1989 in response to the mechanical and software errors that occurred in

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See id. § 101.5614(5).
See id. § 101.5614(6).
Palm Beach, 772 So. 2d at 1229.
See FLA. STAT. ch. 102, § 141 (2000).
See id.
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the race between Connie Mack and Buddy MacKay for the United States
Senate in 1988.107 During that race, ballots became soggy and warped
and could not be read by the machine. In addition, a software error
caused Democratic votes to be counted while Republican votes were
rejected.'
Prior to the amendment, a losing candidate could protest
the election results, but the machine counts were presumptively correct.
The candidate could only protest fraudulent returns in the circuit
court." 9 There was no provision for fixing the machine or the software. Thus, paragraphs (3)-(10) of Section 102.166 were enacted for the
purpose of authorizing the canvassing board to correct any machine
malfunctions rather than merely relying on totals that the Board knew
to be faulty because of the malfunction." 0
A final consideration is that the Division's interpretation was wholly
consistent with Florida case law regarding the appropriateness of
conducting manual recounts in only narrow, specified instances. In its
recitation of facts, the court conveniently glossed over the admission that
the manual recounts at issue were purely the result of the Florida
Democratic Executive Committee's concern over the "closeness of the
election," a significant fact for both legal and practical reasons."' As
a legal matter, the closeness of an election as grounds for conducting
even an initial manual recount is a novelty, as Attorney General
Butterworth admitted in oral argument before the Supreme Court of the
United States." 2 Case law clearly discredited losing political candidates' attempts to reverse the results of an election by hand-counting the
ballots just because the results were close and a discrepancy existed
between the machine recounts. In Broward County CanvassingBoard
v. Hogan,"' the canvassing board explained that voter error in using
the punchcard ballot is caused by "hesitant piercing, no piercing, or

107.

See Response Brief, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 2000 WL

1741597, at *9 n.10 (U. S. Nov. 24, 2000) (citing 1989 FLA. LAWS chs. 89-348, § 15 and
"The Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement" for the Voter Protection Act).
108. Id.
109. See FLA. STAT. ch. 102, §§ 166(1)-(3).
110. See supra note 106.
111. Palm Beach, 772 So. 2d at 1232.
112. Paul F. Hancock argued on behalf of Butterworth. See Transcript of Oral
Argument, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 2000 WL 1763817, at *12. The

Attorney General's conduct throughout the election is questionable. He engaged in ex
parte conversations with the Volusia County Canvassing Board, resulting in their decision
to conduct a manual recount. See Evan Thomas & Michael Isikoff, Shootout in the Sun,
NEWSWEEK 30, 36 (Nov. 27, 2000). See also Third Party Complaint, Gore, 2000 WL
1770264, at *4 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 2, 2000).
113. 607 So. 2d 508, 509-10 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 1992). See also Adams v. Canvassing
Bd. of Broward County, 421 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 1982).
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intentional or unintentional multiple piercing of computer ballot cards,
creating what are referred to as overvotes and undervotes" and that this
error "create[s] loose or hanging paper chads which, although present on
the first count, subsequently fall away on a recount, thereby causing the
difference in count."1 1 4 In addition, the court in Hogan reversed the
trial court's order for a new trial because "there was no evidence
adduced that the machines were malfunctioning, improperly used, or
improperly calibrated, nor any evidence adduced that there was fraud
or impropriety in the manner in which the election was held."1 15 Thus,
a difference between the original election result and the result of the
automatic recount is an insufficient ground for granting a request for a
manual recount." 6 The fact that this was a presidential election was
even greater reason for following existing law, particularly considering
the implications of federal law on the court's decision," 7 as well as the
inability of non-Floridians to take advantage of any recourse against an
activist court, such as voting not to retain the justices."18 What is
more, the other counties could not simply decide to conduct manual
recounts so that all Florida voters would receive the same treatment.
As a practical matter, close elections are no different from any other
election in that, if manual recounts are necessary to validate the "true
intent" of the voters, as the court concluded they are, there simply is no
need for machine counts at all, much less machine recounts. Florida law
already requires the canvassing boards to take precautions to ensure the
accuracy of the vote totals." 9 Further, most of the discrepancies that
occurred in the November 8 machine recount were admittedly the result

114. 607 So. 2d at 509 (emphasis added).
115. Id.
116. The court sympathized with appellant: "It is understandable that an individual
losing an electoral race by three votes and then by five votes upon recount would look upon
the results with some consternation .... Th[is], however, [is] not the controlling factor[]

in the statutory scheme." Id. at 510.
117. Although the United States Supreme Court initially was interested in the effect

2 on the Florida court's decision, it
of 3 U.S.C. § 5 and U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
ultimately decided the issue on equal protection grounds. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. -,
121 S.Ct. 525 (2000).
118. FA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a). This section provides for a retention vote for the

justices of the state supreme court.
119. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 101, § 101.5611 (providing specific types of instructions
to voters); id. § 101.5612 (requiring voting equipment to be tested within 10 days before
an election); id. § 101.5613 (requiring election board members to examine the voting
devices periodically during the election); id. § 101.5614 (providing for duplicates to be made
of spoiled ballots); id. § 101.733 (requiring the Division of Elections to adopt an emergency
contingency plan); id. § 102.141 (requiring canvassing boards to ensure the accuracy of the

returns and to make necessary corrections and report election difficulties).
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of errors by election workers who processed some ballots twice, others
not at all. 2 ° In addition, the court implicitly approved of the canvassing boards' exercise of discretion in determining that the results of their
sample manual recounts indicated an "error in the vote tabulation which
could affect the outcome of the election."12' However, this entire
process places the constitutional right to vote-so far as the court
considers that right manifested in ascertaining the voter's "true
intent"-in the hands of a canvassing board, which may or may not
believe voter error is reason to conduct a recount and which may or may
not find that any sort of voter error "could affect the outcome of the
election. " 122 Thus, proclaiming voter intent as the preeminent consideration becomes nothing more than mere lip service.
Even if the plain language of Section 102.166 did not indicate that
manual recounts were authorized to remedy an error in tabulating the
votes as opposed to voter error in casting votes, at most the court would
legitimately be able to determine that the statute is ambiguous. In light
of the provision in Section 102.166(3), which designates the particular
course of action by the canvassing board depending upon which voting
system was used, a reasonable interpretation of Section 102.166(5) is
that the legislature replicated that designation in paragraphs (a)-(c).
Thus, the canvassing board would select the appropriate remedy from
paragraphs (a)-(c) depending on the nature of the voting system used.
The options listed in Section 102.166(5) suggest an element of correlation
between the voting system and the remedy to be selected. Another
possibility is that the legislature listed the remedies in the order of
initial to last resort. If the error could not be fixed, the canvassing

120. Pinellas County election workers fed one stack of ballots into the machine twice
and failed to process another stack altogether. See Tell, supra note 28. The Democrats'
suit against Nassau County involved an oversight by election officials who had inadvertently omitted 218 ballots from the automatic recount. The ballots had been left in a transport
case and were overlooked. See Proceedings: In re: Contest Trial, Gore, 2000 WL 1802941,
at *214-17. In Volusia County, an election worker left the ballot collection area with two
uninspected bags on election night, and the following day, another election worker
interrupted the recount when he walked in with a bag of ballots he had left in his car the
night before. See Levine, Volusia County, Florida,supra note 24.
121. Palm Beach, 772 So. 2d at 1225. One of the factual issues that was determined
against Gore in the trial before Judge N. Sanders Sauls was the reliability of the statistical
methods of extrapolation employed by the Democrats in projecting the number of "votes"
that could be found among the machine-rejected ballots. See supra notes 34-35.

122. The court fails to address the portion of the statute that modifies "error in vote
tabulation." Only those that "could affect the outcome of the election" require any action
by the canvassing board. But because only four heavily Democratic counties conducted the
initial recounts in three of their most heavily Democratic precincts, any extrapolation based
on those results is highly suspect for the entire county, much less for the entire state.
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board should double-check the software. If neither of these could
alleviate the problem, the canvassing board should manually count the
ballots. Considering the historical context in which Section 102.166(5)
was enacted, either of these interpretations is much more probable than
the court's conclusion, which has no real foundation in the election code.
Therefore, assuming other possible legitimate constructions of an
ambiguous statute exist, the Division's interpretation was entitled to
deference under Florida law. 123 As long as the interpretation "'is
reasonably defensible, it should not be rejected merely because the
courts might prefer another view of the statute.'"'24 Florida law
explicitly gives the Secretary of State, as the Chief Elections Officer, the
authority to interpret election law.' 25 Opinions of the Division of
Elections are binding on subordinate agencies, such as the Palm Beach
Canvassing Board, which sought the opinion at issue,

26

"until properly

amended or revoked by the Division itself, or invalidated by a court
having jurisdiction of the matter. " 127 Palm Beach could not lawfully
conduct a manual recount. Thus, the supreme court had to invalidate
the Division's opinion in order to reach its result-including Palm
Beach's manual counts in the certified election total.
Generally, respect for the separation of powers established in the
Constitution requires courts to show deference to administrative agency
decisions when the legislature uses its lawmaking power to delegate
specific rule-making and enforcement authority to executive agencies. 12 The Florida courts, like other states and the federal courts,
defer to administrative interpretations of laws within their subject

123. Ironically, Justice Pariente, with whom Justice Quince concurred, wrote a rather
sharp rebuke of the majority's opinion in Donatov. AT&T, 767 So. 2d 1146, 1155-56, which
the court cited in Palm Beach, 772 So. 2d at 1228 n.l. Justice Pariente opined that the
deference due the administrative body authorized to administer the Florida Civil Rights
Act was not, as the majority determined, restricted only to "cases of 'doubtful meaning.'"
Justice Pariente further chastised the majority for failing to read all of the relevant
provisions of the statute together to ascertain the legislative meaning, which is particularly
ironic in the context of this dispute in which the most relevant provisions of the election
code are ignored while other portions are read entirely out of context to serve a purpose.
124. Smith v. Crawford, 645 So. 2d 513, 521 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 1994) (quoting
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Yarborough, 275 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 1984)).
125. See FLA. STAT. ch. 97, § 112(1) (2000).
126. See Opinion DE 00-13, supra note 37.
127. See FLA. STAT. ch. 106, § 23(2) (2000).
128. See generally Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984). See also FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("The powers of the state government shall be
divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch
shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly
provided herein.").
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matter jurisdiction as long as the interpretation is reasonable.' 29 In
previous election cases, the court announced this standard of review:
The election process is subject to legislative prescription and constitutional command and is committed to the executive branch of government through duly designated officials all charged with specific duties
....[The] judgments [of those officials] are entitled to be regarded by
the courts as presumptively correct and if rational and not clearly

outside legal requirements should be upheld rather than substituted by
the impression of a particular judge or panel of judges might deem
more appropriate. 3 '
Yet this situation is precisely what occurred in Florida. The justices of
the supreme court substituted their judgment for that of the agency
charged with executing the election code. Considering the language of
the statute, its place in the statutory scheme, the statutory history, and
prior case law on the issue, it is small wonder that the court resorted to
constitutional platitudes and misrepresentations of other statutes in the
election code to support its decision.
B.

The Statutory Deadline That Wasn't
As an initial matter, it should be noted that all sixty-seven counties
in Florida submitted certified returns to the Secretary of State by
November 14, 2000.131 The election code establishes a process for
certifying election returns.'32 Essentially, the process begins with the
inspectors of election at the individual precincts. Once the polls close,
the inspectors lock the voting machines, open the counters, and call out
the vote totals from the counters. Two other inspectors ensure that the
totals called out are correctly recorded on the certificates of returns.
Additional procedural safeguards are in place to ensure further the

129. Smith, 645 So. 2d at 521. See also Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa Political Comm.,
625 So. 2d 840, 844 (Fla. 1993).
130. Krivanek, 625 So. 2d at 844 (quoting Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 268-69
n.5 (Fla. 1975)) (emphasis added). See also Donato, 767 So. 2d at 1153 (stating that the
administrative agency charged with enforcement of a statute "'is entitled to great deference
and should not be overturned unless clearly erroneous or in conflict with the legislative
intent of the statute'").

131. See Emergency Petition for Extraordinary Relief, Harris,2000 WL 1716222, at *1.
In fact, most counties had submitted their returns by November 9, following the automatic
machine recount, and these returns were on file with the Department of State. Volusia
County had finished its manual recount by the statutory deadline. Palm Beach had not

begun its recount, and neither Broward nor Miami-Dade had even voted to begin a recount.
Amended Answer Brief, Palm Beach, 2000 WL 1726664, at *17 (Fla. Nov. 19, 2000).
132. See FLA. STAT. ch. 101, §§ 101.5614, 101.54; and ch. 102, § 141.
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integrity of the recorded totals.'3 3 All precincts are required to submit
these returns to the county canvassing boards by noon on the day
following the election.'
In some cases, the precincts transport the
ballots to a central counting location for tabulation.3 5 The canvassing
boards then compile the totals from all returns from the precincts, certify
that those returns are correct, and submit those returns to the Department of State, along with a report noting any problems occurring from
equipment malfunction or any other unusual circumstances during the
canvassing process.'3 6 A special provision requires canvassing boards
to submit their returns for the election of federal or state officers
"immediately after certification of the election results."'37
But in this election, the Florida court enjoined the Secretary of State
138
from certifying the results of the election as required by Florida law.
Instead, the court determined as an initial matter that manual recounts
were lawful in the absence of any allegation of fraud, machine malfunction, or impropriety in the election process. 139 As previously discussed,
this decision was contrary to the statute, the election code, prior case
law, and the purpose of the statute as indicated by its history. It is also
based on the faulty premise that the machines erroneously rejected
"valid legal votes," despite the explanation by the canvassing board in
Hogan that additional marks on the ballot are often not the result of an
intention to vote. 140 But holding that the manual counts were lawful
was only a first step and a necessary finding for the court to reach its
desired outcome. The second issue before the court was whether the
circuit court erred in holding that the Secretary of State did not abuse
her discretion in refusing to accept the late-filed returns.

133. See § 101.5614.
134. See § 102.141(3).

135. See § 101.5614.
136. See § 102.141.
137. See §§ 102.111, 102.112.
138. Palm Beach, 772 So. 2d at 1239.
139. Id. at 1230. A perusal of Florida case law resolving election disputes quickly
reveals the courts' emphasis on allegations (or the lack thereof) of fraud, machine
malfunction, or impropriety in the election process. See, e.g., Boardman, 323 So. 2d at 271;
Hogan, 607 So. 2d at 510; Brake v. Gissendanner, 206 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1968).
140. 607 So. 2d at 509. The trial before Judge N. Sanders Sauls to contest the election
made clear that not only can indentations on the ballot be made by a fingernail or ring but
the infamous chads can also pop out from bending the ballots. See Proceeding: In re:
Contest Trial, 2000 WL 1802941, at *40-42. None of these situations indicates any
intention by a voter to vote for a particular candidate, but a manual count would probably
result in this sort of vote.
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On this issue, the court again faced a difficult obstacle: the standard
of review. Courts routinely uphold determinations by a lower court or
an official who is acting within the scope of the discretion granted that
person. This freedom to act is inherent in the nature of "discretion."
Only if the decision-maker can be shown to have acted arbitrarily is the
decision overturned.14 1 Judge Terry Lewis understood this basic legal
principle when he determined the Secretary of State had considered the
142
relevant factors in making her decision not to accept late returns.
Abuse of discretion is a low legal threshold. For the court to hold as it
did on this issue, it had to find both that the Secretary of State, as an
executive officer, abused her discretion in carrying out her legal duties
and that the circuit court erred in finding that there was no abuse of
discretion. This would be the third legal decision that the court was
required to reverse, and a fourth decision was reversed"4 before the
United States Supreme Court called a halt to the nonsense.
The court found two ambiguities within the relevant code provisions.
The first was purely manufactured; the second, though legitimate,
provided the court with an opportunity to construe the statute in a way
that deprived it of any meaning. The court found that the time frame
established for filing an election protest necessarily conflicted with the
requirement in Sections 102.111144 and 102.112145 for canvassing

141.

Abuse of discretion is subject to a reasonableness standard: If reasonable people

could disagree, the judge or administrator cannot be said to have abused his or her
discretion. See White v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 766 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1st Dist.

Ct. 2000) (stating that reviewing courts will not find an abuse of discretion when
reasonable people could differ).
142. See Order Denying Emergency Motion to Compel Compliance with and for
Enforcement of Injunction, McDermott v. Harris, 2000 WL 1741600 (Fla. 2d. Dist. Ct. Nov.
17, 2000).
143. In Gore v. Harris,2000 WL 1801246, at *1, *6, *9, *10 (Fla. Dec. 8, 2000), the
state high court reversed the trial court's findings in almost every respect. But the trial
transcript clearly reflects that no evidence was introduced that voters were prevented in
any way from casting their votes or that the machines themselves failed accurately to
register valid votes. See Proceedings: In re: Contest Trial, Gore, 2000 WL 1802941, at
*19-54.

144. FLA. STAT. ch. 102, § 111. It reads in pertinent part:
Immediately after certification of any election by the county canvassing board, the
results shall be forwarded to the Department of State concerning the election of
any federal or state officer ....

If the county returns are not received by the

Department of State by 5 p.m. of the seventh day following an election, all missing
counties shall be ignored, and the results shown by the returns on file shall be
certified.

145. FA. STAT. ch. 102, § 112. It states in pertinent part:
(1) The county canvassing board ... shall file the county returns for the election
of a federal or state officer with the Department of State immediately after
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boards to submit their certified election results to the Department of
State. But this interpretation is clearly not the case for several reasons.
First, the court created a worst-case scenario to establish the
purported conflict between the statutory provisions."4 In this scenario, the canvassing board had not certified the results of the election for
that county by the sixth day following the election. On that sixth day,
the losing candidate protested the election results as erroneous according
to Section 102.166(2) 47 and also filed a request for a manual recount
pursuant to Section 102.166(4).14s Although the court skipped over
this detail, the canvassing board would necessarily have had to grant the
request, conduct the initial manual recount according to Section
102.166(4)(d),' 49 and find "an error in the vote tabulation that could
affect the outcome of the election," all of which is left to the canvassing
board's discretion. 5 ° Then the canvassing board would need to select
a manual recount of all ballots as the appropriate remedy. Thus, the
court concluded, in a large county with a substantial number of voters,
"logic dictates that the period of time required to complete a manual
recount ... may require several days." 1'

Hence, a conflict exists

between the statutes.
The court's logic is problematic in numerous ways. Because of the
rapidity with which the tabulating equipment can produce a final count,
precinct officials are able to submit their certified returns to the
appropriate county canvassing boards well before the deadline of noon
on the day following the election as required by law.'52 The canvassing boards have merely to transfer those totals onto their own certifi-

certification of the election results. Returns must be filed by 5 p.m. on the 7th day
following the ... election .... If the returns are not received by the department

by the time specified, such returns may be ignored and the results on file at the
time may be certified by the department. (2) The department shall fine each
board member $200 for each day such returns are late, the fines to be paid only
from the board member's personal funds.
146. Palm Beach, 772 So. 2d at 1232.
147. Section 102.166(2) states, "Such protest shall be filed with the canvassing board
prior to the time the canvassing board certifies the results for the office being protested
or within 5 days after midnight of the date the election was held, whichever occurs later."
148. Section 102.166(4) requires that a written request for a manual recount be
submitted, along with the reason for the desired recount, prior to the canvassing board's
certification of the results or within 72 hours after midnight of election day, whichever is
later.
149. See FLA. STAT. ch. 102, § 102.166(4)(c)-(d) (requiring the selection of at least three
precincts and at least one percent of the total votes cast for the candidate to be counted).
150. See § 102.166(5).
151. Palm Beach, 772 So. 2d at 1237.
152. See FLA. STAT. ch. 102, § 141(3).
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cates of return, while checking for errors, before the county returns are
ready to be submitted to the Department of State. In fact, Union County
managed to count each of its 4,084 ballots by hand and report its results
on election day." 3 Further, in practice, because the precincts transmit
their results to the county by electronic means, the canvassing boards
canvass the returns and report the results to the Division of Elections
on election day or very shortly thereafter.'"
Even if the hypothetical canvassing board had experienced a virtually
impossible "snag" that would prevent its submission of the returns until
the sixth day following the election, the Board would, no doubt, consider
this factor in its determination of whether to grant the request for an
initial, limited manual recount.'55 Prior to the court's decision in this
very case (and no doubt absent the intense political pressure created by
the parties in this case), the Board would have denied the request
summarily if it were based on nothing more than the closeness of an
election. What is more, the candidate has no "right," not even a
statutory right, to an initial recount. Thus, the candidate who chooses
to wait until the day before the statutory deadline to file a protest can
have little expectation of success. As was mentioned in the oral
argument before the court on this issue, a student may have a week to
complete an assignment, but if the student waits until the day before the
assignment is due to begin, he will most likely fail to meet his deadline.' 56 This failure does not mean the deadline does not exist.
In addition, the "conflict" created by the court was far from the facts
that were before it. The Democrats filed an election protest and a
request for a manual recount with Palm Beach, Volusia, Broward, and
Miami-Dade Counties on November 9, well within the court's hypothetical conflicting time frame.'57 Volusia County conducted a full manual
recount of its 179,661 votes and submitted its certified results to the
Department of State within the statutory deadline. 5 After submitting
its certified results the day before, on November 15 the Broward County

153. See Kunerth, supra note 11.
154. See, e.g., Levine, Volusia County, Florida, supra note 24 (noting that computer
problems prevented six precincts from transmitting their returns to the county so that the
county's returns were delayed until 3:00 a.m.).
155. See Hogan, 607 So. 2d at 510 (finding that the canvassing board's ability to
conduct the requested manual recount in a short period of time was "immaterial" to the
case).

156. Joe Kock, the outside counsel for the Secretary of State, made this point to the
court. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris
(visited Dec. 12, 2000) <http://wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/transcript/00-2346.htm>.
157. Palm Beach, 772 So. 2d at 1225 n.3.
158. See Appellant's Statement of Status, Touchston, 2000 WL 1720090, at *2.
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Canvassing Board reversed its earlier decision and voted two-to-one to
conduct a full manual recount.'5 9 The Miami-Dade Canvassing Board
did not even meet and decide to conduct a full recount until November
17, three days after the deadline."6 Palm Beach voted to begin a full
manual recount two days before the statutory deadline but had not
begun that count on November 16.'
Thus, any "conflict" in the time
frame for protests and the statutory deadline for submitting returns was
the result of delay and indecision by the canvassing boards. However,
it cannot legitimately be concluded that the voters should not be
"penalized" for the dilatory behavior of the canvassing boards because
the canvassing boards can decide whether to conduct the initial recount
in the first instance, whether the results of any such recount constitute
an error in tabulation that could affect the outcome of the election, and
then whether a manual recount is an appropriate response to the error.
Even if not the case, the governing statute specifically requires as part
of the procedure for conducting a manual recount that "[t]he county
canvassing board shall appoint as many counting teams ...as necessary
to manually recount the ballots."'6 2 While this language does not
specify a deadline, the most natural reading of this statute, which should
be read in pari materia with other relevant statutory provisions, is that
the legislature intended "as necessary" to be read in conjunction with the
deadline established in Section 102.112. Any other reading would
render the provision meaningless because one counting team could
complete the manual recount if there were no need for haste.
In the presence of only a hypothetical conflict, the court concluded that
"[allowing the manual recounts to proceed in an expeditious manner,
rather than imposing an arbitrary seven-day deadline, is consistent...
with the statutory scheme."'' The irony in this statement is rich.
The court denounced as arbitrary the legislature's deadline, which was
arrived at through the normal, slow, deliberative, law-making processes,
and then the court proceeded to create its own arbitrary deadline of
November 26. The irony grows when one considers that two of the four
counties still did not meet this new, arbitrary deadline, and the Gore
campaign had insufficient time to have the ballots manually inspected
during the truncated time for an election contest before the federal

159. See supra note 42.
160. See id.; see also Miami-Dade County Democratic Party v. Miami-Dade County
Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. 2000).
161. See supra note 42. See also Answer Brief, Palm Beach, 2000 WL 1726664, at *18
(Fla. Nov. 19, 2000); Appellant's Statement of Status, Touchston, 2000 WL 1720090, at *2.
162. See FLA. STAT. ch. 102, § 166(7) (2000).
163. Palm Beach, 772 So. 2d at 1238.
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deadline of December 12.64 The legislature's "arbitrary" deadline
makes abundant sense in light of the very events the court unleashed by
negating that deadline.
One would think at this point the court would have run out of steam
from having to overcome so many little "legalities" in reaching its
conclusions, but the court needed to take one final step to eviscerate any
meaning in the election code and any authority granted to the Secretary
of State as the executive officer charged with administering that code.
The court determined that Section 102.111 conflicted with Section
102.112 because the former stated that the Secretary "shall" ignore latefiled returns while the latter used the word "may."'6 5 Sound arguments can be made that the two statutes can, in fact, be read harmoniously, a canon of statutory construction to which the court paid lip
service. 6 ' The statutes are directed at different officials. However,
even assuming a conflict exists and Section 102.112 controls, the court
still reached an illogical and impermissibly narrow interpretation of the
statute.
Not surprisingly, the court turned to the state constitution to
rationalize its final blow to the other two branches of government in
creating and executing the laws governing elections in the state of
Florida.'6 7 By referring to the right of suffrage as the "preeminent
right ... without [which] all other [freedoms] would be diminished,""
the court performed its own verbal legerdemain. A statutory provision
authorizing the state's Chief Elections Officer to ignore late-filed returns
suddenly became a requirement to accept late-filed returns unless one
of two vague, undefined circumstances occurred: the tardiness would
bar a losing candidate from exercising his statutory right to contest an
election, or the tardiness would cause all Florida voters to be disenfranchised in a federal election.1 6 9 But this is clearly an empty definition

164. The "safe harbor" provision in 3 U.S.C. § 5 "requires that any controversy or
contest that is designed to lead to a conclusive selection of electors be completed by

December 12." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. _, -, 121 S. Ct. 525, 533 (2000).
165. Palm Beach, 772 So. 3d 1233-34.
166. Id. at 1234-35. Worth noting is that the court did not refer to this canon while
construing the statutes that supposedly conflict in their time requirements.
167. See id. at 1236-38. These vague references to the preeminent right to vote and
restraints on the right of suffrage are noticeably absent in the court's "sanitized" version
of this decision issued Dec. 11, 2000. This omission was a half-hearted attempt to convince
the United States Supreme Court that it was not relying on the state constitution to
change state election laws after the election but was only engaged in "generic" statutory
interpretation.

168. Id. at 1236.
169. Id. at 1237.
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of "discretion" because the Secretary of State would violate state or
federal law if either of these results obtained. Considering the results
of the court's extension of the deadline by an additional twelve days, it
would seem in retrospect that the Secretary of State was correct in
exercising her discretion to reject late-filed returns because any
extension of the statutory deadline would risk the very results the court
created as predicates for denying the returns. Nevertheless, Florida case
law indicates that past election contests for offices less "significant" to
the nation than President can take many months to complete.' 70 Thus,
it seems ridiculous for the court to have chosen these particular events
to establish the scope of the Secretary's discretion under the statute,
especially when the statute also applies to candidates for state offices.
IV.

REFRAINING FROM ENTERING THE POLITICAL SPHERE

The Florida Supreme Court erred in almost every way possible during
the presidential election litigation. While the politicians and pundits
uttered their suspicions regarding the individual justices' political
motivations for their decisions, these suspicions are largely irrelevant
insofar as the court was utterly wrong even if acting for all the "right"
reasons. The court repeatedly voiced its concern that the voters were
the central figures in the election process and that the "true intent" of
the voters should be honored.''
The court stated that "[tiechnical
statutory requirements must not be exalted over the substance" of the
right to vote and that the voters whose ballots were at issue "did
everything which the Election Code requires when they punched the
appropriate chad with the stylus."'72 But this is not accurate. Either
the voters erred in failing to follow instructions, which the code clearly
requires to be provided to voters, 17 3 and the voters failed to correct
their errors using their three opportunities to get it right, 1 74 or the
discrepancy in the vote counts resulted from one or more of the
numerous ways a ballot's integrity is compromised from much handling.
No allegations of fraud, misconduct, impropriety in the conduct of the
election, or machine malfunction were made. Thus, there is little
evidence and no assurance that Florida citizens' right to vote was
compromised.

170. See, e.g., Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1976) (taking four years to
resolve an election contest); Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720
(Fla. 1998) (taking two years to resolve an election contest).
171. Palm Beach, 772 So. 2d at 1228, 1236, 1238.
172. Id. at 1238.
173. See FLA. STAT. ch. 101, §§ 101.5611; 101.031.
174. See id. §§ 101.5608(2)(b), 101.011(5).
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The state constitution does ensure that citizens have the right to vote,
175
but it also clearly provides for the legislature to regulate elections.
And like any other right, the right to vote is not absolute. The value of
the right varies among citizens. Just as the "right" to select abortion as
a means of birth control or the right to bear arms is valueless to some,
the right to vote is not exercised by many Americans and many
Floridians. Moreover, the state can do only so much to ensure that a
citizen maximizes his or her rights. At some point, citizens must take
some responsibility in the exercise of their rights, including reading the
instructions on how to vote, or risk disenfranchising themselves.
The court's decision sacrificed the law in its purported purpose of
protecting Florida voters. The problem from the beginning, though, is
that the court had no reason to believe the voters needed to be protected.
A losing candidate claimed a hand count of ballots in certain counties
would reveal he had actually won the election, but this claim is
nonsensical. Courts cannot ignore burdens of proof, statutory schemes,
and legal precedence simply to accommodate a political candidate's belief
in victory no matter how earnest or sincere the belief and no matter how
close the election. Further, the court ignored the political pressure faced
by the canvassing boards to abandon established procedures and to
exercise their discretion in a way that conformed to their political
affiliations. The litigation documents surrounding Miami-Dade's flipflopping over whether to count reveals the extent of the political
pressure on that canvassing board. One of the board members admitted
that press reports had influenced her vote,"' and the Board initially
concluded from the limited manual recount of three precincts in which
Gore received six additional votes that "truly there was no error in the
tabulation system." 177 That situation does nothing to protect Florida
voters, particularly when the integrity of the ballots that were being
counted had not been established as the law requires. 7 Although the
court's decision occurred during the protest phase of the election, what
the court was being asked to do rightfully belonged in the contest phase,
during which the court would have discovered the facts it needed to

175. FLA. CONST. art VI, § 1 ("All elections by the people shall be by direct and secret
vote. General elections shall be determined by a plurality of votes cast. Registration and
elections, shall.., be regulated by law") (emphasis added).
176. See Opposition Brief, Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1773459, at *2 (citing Nov. 17, 2000
Hearing Transcript, at 110-11).
177. Id. at *2 (citing Nov. 14, 2000 Hearing Transcript, at 49 (Supervisor Leahy, with
whom Judge Lehr concurred)).
178. See Brake v. Gissendanner, 206 So. 2d 10, 12-13 (1968) ("The law is well settled
that election ballots cannot be used to impeach an official return unless the integrity of the

ballots is first clearly established by the plaintiff.").
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avoid its erroneous decision based on an erroneous assumption that
voters were being disenfranchised.
Sensibly, the state court had demonstrated great reluctance to involve
itself in election disputes. 179 Courts become nothing more than a
conduit to political power and engineers of social change if the justices
abandon their limited role in government, particularly elections. Critics
gain much ammunition for the argument that courts actually thwart the
American system by which citizens make choices regarding their leaders,
their social and economic preferences, and other values through
accountable elected officials. If an individual or group cannot succeed
through the legislative process, the court should not become a way to
bypass the will of the majority. In this case, the usual process of
government resulted in an election code that simply did not provide for
"finding" additional votes that may or may not actually be valid
indications of a voter's preference simply because the losing candidate
believed he really won.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court of Florida seriously jeopardized its legitimacy as
a court in Palm, Beach. The court refused to give deference to the
reasonable decision of an executive official who had explicitly been given
authority to administer the election code. Instead, the court tortured
statutory language and relied upon irrelevant provisions to achieve its
desired result. Rather than harmonizing statutes, the court searched for
conflicts and construed the statutes in a way that contradicted legislative intent.
While the court may actually have been concerned with protecting
Floridians' constitutional right to vote, it acted without first discovering
whether the right had been compromised, and it substituted its own
judgment that manual recounts would provide an accurate reflection of
the vote when the legislature clearly rejected that notion as evidenced
by the entire election code. To reach an immediate, desired result, the
court risked the loss of faith citizens place in the judiciary as an
objective body operating according to principles and not personal
predilection. The court confused a good decision with its view of a good
result.
The judiciary's only accountability is in the appellate review process,
and to a lesser extent, in the requirement to publish opinions justifying
the court's conclusion. For a state supreme court, the first check rarely

179. See Gore v. Harris, 2000 WL 1801246, at *19. See also William Glaberson, Florida
Courts Tread Warily In Ballot Fights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2000, at Al.
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exists because those bodies are the final arbiters of state law and the
state constitution in the absence of a federal question or a constitutional
amendment by the state legislature. Therefore, it is imperative that the
justices soberly consider their roles and refrain from pronouncing
judgments that are self-serving or that are even "in the best interest of
society" as determined by the judges except in those cases in which the
legislature has not made those judgments. Policy decisions are
inherently value decisions and as such are best left to the people who
must be governed by the laws that reflect society's values. Assuming
that Florida's high court was motivated by its belief that allowing
manual recounts to continue was the "best" way to protect Florida's
voters, this "desirable" end did not justify the means the court employed-ignoring, contorting, and undermining the law in order to
"improve" it.
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